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Recent Cases
THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT
DENIES CONSUMERS,
AS INDIRECT
PURCHASERS,
STANDING TO SUE
UNDER THE CLAYTON
ACT
In Kansas and Missouri v. Utilicorp United Inc., U.S., 110
S.Ct. 2807 (1990), the United
States Supreme Court held that
only utility companies, as direct
purchasers, have standing to sue
gas suppliers who allegedly violated the Clayton Act by overcharging
the utility companies for natural
gas. In so holding, the Supreme
Court excluded the utilities' customers from the definition of an
injured party under the Clayton
Act.
Background
Utilicorp United, Inc. ("Utilicorp"), an investor-owned public
utility company, purchased overpriced natural gas from a pipeline
company. Utilicorp, another utility company and several gas purchasers (collectively "the utilities")
sued a pipeline company and five
gas production companies (collectively "the suppliers") in the United States District Court for the
District of Kansas. The utilities
claimed that the suppliers had violated the Clayton Act ("Act"), 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1988), through a price
inflation conspiracy with respect to
natural gas. Section 4 of the Act
authorizes any person injured by
an antitrust violation to sue for
treble damages. Clayton Act § 4, 38
Stat. 731, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988). In
accordance with the Act, the utilities sought to recover treble damages for the amount of the overcharge and the decrease in sales
which resulted from the overcharge.
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The States of Kansas and Missouri ("the States") brought separate actions in the district court
against the same suppliers. As parens patriae on behalf of indirect
purchasers, those persons residing
within Kansas and Missouri who
had purchased the over-priced gas
from any of the utility companies,
the States alleged the same violations under the Act. The States also
represented state agencies, municipalities and other political subdivisions which had purchased gas
from the producers. The district
court consolidated all the actions.
In response, the producers
claimed that the utilities lacked
standing to sue under § 4 of the Act
because they had suffered no injury, as required under the Act. The
utilities' customers had paid the
entire amount of the alleged overcharge, as the utilities had "passed
through" these charges to their
customers.
The utilities moved for a partial
summary judgment in response to
defendant's claim that the utilities
lacked standing. In accordance
with Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United
Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S.
481 (1968), and IllinoisBrick Co. v.
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), the
district court dismissed the States'
parenspatriaeclaims because only
the utilities, as direct purchasers
from the producers, suffered injury
under § 4 of the Act. The district
court interpreted Hanover Shoe
and Illinois Brick as holding that
although a direct purchaser may
pass through to its customers the
full overcharge derived from a purchase from an antitrust violator,
only the direct purchaser suffers
the antitrust injury. Accordingly,
the States, as parens patriaeof the
indirect purchasers, did not have
standing to sue under the Act.
On interlocutory appeal of the
district court's decision, the court
of appeals affirmed the district
court and held that Hanover Shoe
and Illinois Brick required the dis-

missal of the parenspatriaeclaims.
The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorarito decide whether the States had standing to sue
under § 4 of the Act.
Hanover Shoe and IllinoisBrick
Apply
Before the United States Supreme Court, the States made three
arguments in support of their claim
that the utilities' customers had
standing to sue under § 4 of the
Act. First, the States claimed that
the holdings in Hanover Shoe and
Illinois Brick should not be extended to this case because the reasoning behind those decisions did not
apply to regulated public utility
cases.
The States conceded that the
utilities' customers, like the consumers of the over-priced goods in
Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick,
are indirect purchasers because
they did not transact business directly with the alleged antitrust
violators. Nevertheless, the States
claimed that the instant case can be
distinguished from Hanover Shoe
and Illinois Brick. In the present
case, the utilities passed on the
entire overcharge to the consumers, whereas in Hanover Shoe and
Illinois Brick, the direct purchasers
passed on only part of the alleged
overcharge to the consumers. The
States argued that the concerns
which motivated the Court in Hanover Shoe and IllinoisBrick, specifically, the difficulty of apportionment, the risk of multiple recovery
and the decreased incentives for
antitrust enforcement did not exist
in this case, where the direct purchasers passed on the entire overcharge to their customers.
The Apportionment Problem
The States asserted that an apportionment problem exists when
a court must determine the amount
of overcharge absorbed by the direct purchaser and the amount of
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overcharge absorbed by the indirect purchaser. According to this
definition, the States argued that
no apportionment problem existed
in this case because the customers
paid the entire overcharge in accordance with state utility commission tariff schedules. The commission maintained public files
recording the volume and price of
gas sold to the consumers. The
States reasoned that they could
accurately prove customer injury
from the commission's files.
Therefore, the States argued that
the customers should be allowed to
sue for the entire overcharge while
the utilities should be allowed to
sue only for lost business damages.
The Supreme Court disagreed
and stated that the States oversimplified the apportionment problem. The Court found that an
apportionment problem would exist even where the utilities passed
on the entire overcharge to the
consumers; if the utilities raised
their prices to pass on costs to
consumers, market forces might
prevent the utilities from raising
their prices again to increase profits. Thus, the Court found that the
utilities would still be injured by
the overcharge to the extent that
they would have raised prices for
profit or other purposes in the
absence of the overcharge.
The Court reasoned that in order to avoid an apportionment
problem, the indirect purchaser
would have to prove that the direct
purchaser would not have raised its
prices before the alleged overcharge. However, proving the direct purchaser's pricing intentions
would be extremely difficult. A
court would not only have to determine the extent of market limitations affecting utility price increases prior to the overcharge but
would also have to determine the
price increase levels permitted by
state regulators. A court would
have to establish that state regulators would have only permitted a
rate increase corresponding to the
illegal overcharge amount in order
to conclude that a utility suffered
no injury from the overcharge.
Therefore, the Court concluded

that an apportionment problem
still existed because it would be
nearly impossible to determine
whether and by how much the
utilities would have raised their
prices absent the alleged overcharge.
In addition, the Court found
that questions of timing would
further complicate the apportionment of overcharge damages between a direct and an indirect
purchaser. Namely, a lag may exist
between the time when the producers pass on an overcharge to the
utilities and the time when the
utilities pass on an overcharge to
the customers. The utilities would
bear the cost of this lag time, and
therefore, would suffer some injury
due to the overcharge. In addition,
the difficulty of proving exactly
when and how much of the overcharge was passed on would further complicate the apportionment
of the overcharge between the utilities and the consumers.
Risk of Multiple Recovery
The States also asserted that no
risk of multiple recovery existed.
The States sought damages for the
amount of the overcharge, and the
utilities sought damages for lost
sales due to the overcharge. However, the Court stated that allowing
the States to remain in the case
would further the existing confusion of multiple parties and competing claims without providing
any benefit since state regulatory
law in Kansas and Missouri may
require that the utilities give a
portion of their § 4 recovery to
their customers.
Decreased Antitrust Enforcement
In addition, the States claimed
that the concern in Hanover Shoe
and Illinois Brick that suits by
indirect purchasers would diminish vigorous antitrust law enforcement did not exist here. Rather,
the States asserted that relying on
direct purchaser actions in utility
cases would fail to promote antitrust enforcement. In support of
their argument, the States noted
that utilities lacked incentive to

bring § 4 actions, since utilities
may pass on their costs to customers and they also may have to pass
on to customers the § 4 damages
they have recovered.
However, the Court rejected the
States' argument. The Court noted
that utilities still may be prompted
to bring § 4 actions because of the
possibility that state regulators will
not allow them to pass on overcharges to their customers. In addition, the Court found that utilities
would not have to pass on their
entire damages to their customers
since utilities received treble damages under § 4. The Court also
noted that utilities maintained a
successful record of diligently
bringing § 4 actions. For these
reasons, the Court concluded that
utilities did not lack incentive to
sue overcharging suppliers.
Additionally, the Court cited
several reasons why indirect purchaser actions may fail to promote
antitrust enforcement: indirect
purchasers may not possess the
requisite expertise to bring § 4
actions; state attorneys general
may be reluctant to bring smaller
or speculative harm suits on behalf
of consumers; and state attorneys
general may only bring parens patriae actions on behalf of state
residents. In conclusion, the Court
noted that some of the concerns
underlying Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick did not apply as strongly
in the instant case. However, the
importance of the general rule
which gave only direct purchasers
standing to sue justified the
Court's decision not to undermine
the rule by creating exceptions.
The Court thus held that § 4 of the
Act denied the States, as parens
patriae of indirect purchasers,
standing to sue.
Cost-Plus Contract Exception
Inapplicable
The States contended that the
cost-plus contracts exception suggested in Illinois Brick should apply to this case. In Illinois Brick,
the Court noted that an exception
to the direct purchaser rule exists
when a customer must buy a fixed
quantity of a product regardless of
(continued on page 22)

Volume 3 Number 1/Fall, 1990

21

Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

Clayton Act Standing
(continued from page 21)

price under a contractual agreement. In this situation, the overcharge can be determined in advance without the complications of
market forces of supply and demand. Namely, the direct purchaser will pass on the entire overcharge to its customer who is
required to buy a fixed quantity of
a product regardless of price. The
States argued that because state
tariff schedules required the utilities to pass through costs to consumers, the cost-plus contract exception applied.
However, the Court stated that a
cost-plus contract situation did not
exist in this case, despite the state
regulation of public utilities. The
utilities did not sell to their customers under a pre-existing costplus contract; the customers did
not agree to purchase a fixed quantity of gas. In addition, the Court
emphasized that under a cost-plus
contract, a direct purchaser bears
no portion of the overcharge and
therefore suffers no injury under
the Act. In contrast, in this case,
the utilities had no guarantee of an
established profit, and indeed they
may have suffered a portion of the
overcharge. Therefore, the Court
held that although a cost-plus exception may exist, such an exception did not apply to the utilities in
the instant case.
Hart-Scott-Rodino Does Not Apply
Finally, the States contended
that § 4C of the Hart-Scott- Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act of
1976 ("HSR Act"), 90 Stat. 1394,
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 15c
(1980), allowed the States to sue on
behalf of the consumers notwithstanding their indirect purchaser
status. The Court rejected this argument and reiterated its statement in Illinois Brick that § 4C of
the HSR Act did not create any
new substantive liability. Section
4C merely created a new procedural device whereby state attorneys
general could bring parens patriae
actions on behalf of injured direct
purchasers.
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The Dissent
The dissent premised its entire
argument on the assumption that
the utilities passed through the
entire overcharge to their customers. The dissent contended that the
majority should have decided this
case based on this assumption because one of the utilities admitted
this assumption, and both the district court and the court of appeals
ruled according to this assumption.
Assuming that a complete pass-on
occurred, the dissent argued that
none of the concerns present in
Illinois Brick existed here, and
therefore, the majority's dependance on Illinois Brick was misplaced. The dissent suggested that
the majority should have followed
the explicit language of § 4 which
permitted recovery to those injured by antitrust violations without distinguishing between classes
of customers.
First, the dissent stated that no
apportionment problem existed
which would support the majority's decision. Noting that public
utilities are regulated, the dissent
reasoned that there existed a complete pass-through of the overcharge because the utilities would
undoubtedly pass through as much
of the overcharge as permitted by
law. In addition, the dissent found
that the amount of such overcharge
could have been determined easily
from the customers' utility bills;
the utility bills would have stated
how much gas a customer bought
at the illegal price. The dissent also
stated that the majority's concern
over the problem of proving
whether the utilities would have
raised their rates absent the overcharge is a problem which arises in
many antitrust cases; courts frequently separate price increases
related to anticompetitive conduct
from those related to legitimate
conduct.
Second, the dissent described
the majority's concern with timing
difficulties with respect to apportionment as speculative. The dissent found that regardless of the
delay of the utilities in passing
through the overcharge, the customers would inevitably pay for
the overcharge.

Third, the dissent contended
that granting standing to indirect
purchasers where a complete passthrough of an overcharge existed
would not decrease enforcement of
antitrust laws because the indirect
purchasers could easily discover
the injury. In addition, the utilities
have no incentive to seek damages
for the amount of the illegal overcharge, since its injury only consists of a loss in sales rather than a
loss of the entire amount of the
overcharge. Thus, according to the
dissent, in light of the evidence of a
complete pass-through of the overcharge, the apportionment concerns of the majority did not compel dismissal of the States' claim.
Finally, the dissent stated that
the multiple liability problem
which existed in Illinois Brick did
not exist here. Therefore, the problem of multiple liability could not
justify the majority's decision. The
dissent reasoned that where a complete pass-through existed there
was no problem of multiple liability because the utilities and the
States requested separate and distinct damages. The utilities sought
damages for lost sales, whereas the
States sought damages for the
amount of the overcharge. Therefore, the dissent determined that
since none of the concerns which
existed in the Illinois Brick case
existed here, the States had standing to sue under § 4 of the Act.
Mira Djordjic

NATIONAL TRAFFIC
AND MOTOR VEHICLE
SAFETY ACT
PARTIALLY PREEMPTS
DEFECTIVE DESIGN
CLAIM
In Pokorny v. Ford Motor Company, 902 F.2d 1116 (3d Cir.
1990), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit held
that the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act ("Safety
Act") preempted a common law
liability claim against a van manufacturer for failure to equip its vans
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